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Despite extensive testing and correctness certification of their functional semantics, a number of compiler
optimizations have been shown to violate security guarantees implemented in source code. While prior work
has shed light on how such optimizations may introduce semantic security weaknesses into programs, there
remains a significant knowledge gap concerning the impacts of compiler optimizations on non-semantic
properties with security implications. In particular, little is currently known about how code generation and
optimization decisions made by the compiler affect the availability and utility of reusable code segments
(called gadgets) required to mount code reuse attack methods such as return-oriented programming.
In this paper, we bridge this gap through a study of the impacts of compiler optimization on code reuse
gadget populations. We analyze and compare 1,000 different variants of 17 different benchmark programs
built with two production compilers (GCC and Clang) to determine how compiler optimization affects code
reuse gadget sets available in program binaries. Our results expose an important and unexpected problem;
compiler optimizations introduce new gadgets at a high rate and produce code containing gadgets that are
generally more useful to an attacker crafting a code reuse exploit than those in unoptimized code.
Using differential binary analysis, we identify several compiler behaviors at the root of this phenomenon.
In turn, we show that these impacts can be significantly mitigated through security-focused post-production
software transformation passes. Finally, we provide an analysis of the performance impacts of our proposed
mitigations to demonstrate that they are negligible.
CCS Concepts: • Software and its engineering→ Source code generation; • Security and privacy→
Software security engineering.
Additional Key Words and Phrases: Compilers, Code generation, Code optimization, Computer security, Code
reuse attacks, Code reuse gadgets
1 INTRODUCTION
The design and implementation of code optimizations in production compilers is primarily con-
cerned with the performance and correctness of the resulting optimized code. The security impact of
these design choices are difficult to determine and even more difficult to quantify, which is a natural
consequence of the implementation-dependent nature of security bugs. Further, security issues
with compiler optimizations are also difficult to detect during correctness certification because they
may not be captured by the operational semantics model used in correctness proofs [D’Silva et al.
2015]. As a result, a significant knowledge gap exists regarding the impact of code optimization
on security that has been the subject of several research papers [Belleville et al. 2018; Besson et al.
2018; Deng and Namjoshi 2017, 2018; Lim et al. 2017; Proy et al. 2017; Simon et al. 2018].
Prior work by D’Silva et al. [2015] has shown that a number of compiler optimizations, despite
being formally proven sound and correct, can introduce a number of semantic security weaknesses
exploitable by an attacker. The security weaknesses identified in this work fall into one of three
classes: information leaks, elimination of security-relevant code due to undefined behavior, and side
channel introduction. However, recent work by Brown and Pande [2019a] suggests that compiler
optimizations may introduce a fourth class of security weakness: increased availability and quality
of code reuse gadgets used in mounting gadget-based code reuse attacks (CRAs).
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As opposed to redirecting control flow to malicious code that has been injected into memory,
gadget-based CRAs instead chain together snippets of the vulnerable program’s code called gadgets
to implement their malicious code. The diversity and utility of code reuse gadgets available to
an attacker depends primarily on the code generation and optimization decisions made by the
compiler when producing the executable binary and its linked libraries. Gadget-based CRAs are
particularly insidious; since they do not rely on code injection, they circumvent code injection
defenses and can achieve Turing-completeness. While numerous gadget-based CRA defenses have
been proposed since Shacham’s [2007] seminal paper, adoption of these defenses remains low due
to weaknesses against increasingly complex attack patterns and runtime overhead costs [Carlini
and Wagner 2014; Kayaalp et al. 2012a; Muntean et al. 2019; van der Veen et al. 2017].
In their work, Brown and Pande demonstrate that software debloating transformations can result
in negative security impacts with respect to the set of gadgets available for gadget-based CRAs.
Specifically, they show that removing unneeded features from program source code introduces new
code reuse gadgets into debloated binaries at a high rate, despite an overall reduction in the total
number of gadgets. Further, they show that in some cases the introduced gadgets are more useful to
an attacker than the gadgets that are removed, resulting in overall negative security impacts. While
debloating and compiler optimization are different types of transformations, the mechanisms by
which new gadgets are introduced are common to both. Interestingly, the authors cite differences
in the behavior of compiler optimizations on debloated code versus bloated code as one of the
causes of gadget introduction [Brown and Pande 2019a].
1.1 Motivation
These findings invite questions about the impact of similar software transformations on code reuse
gadget sets found in program binaries. In this paper, we are motivated to answer the following
questions regarding compiler optimizations and their effects that have been raised by prior work:
(1) To what degree do compiler optimizations introduce new gadgets in optimized code?
(2) To what degree do compiler optimizations negatively impact the security of optimized code
with respect to CRA gadget sets?
(3) Which specific optimizations result in negative security impacts?
(4) What are the root causes of the observed negative security impacts?
(5) How can these negative security effects be prevented or mitigated?
(6) What is the performance cost of implementing such mitigations?
To answer our first three motivating questions, we conducted a broad study of the impacts of
compiler optimizations on code reuse gadget sets. Using two production compilers, GCC and Clang,
we built 1,000 total binary variants across a diverse set of 17 programs. These variants were built
with different optimization configurations to support both coarse-grained analysis of predefined
compiler optimization levels (i.e., O0, O1, O2, O3) and fine-grained analysis which isolates the
effects of individual optimizations. To identify negative impacts, we analyzed and compared these
variants using a CRA gadget-specific static analysis tool, GSA [Brown 2020]. GSA catalogs the set
of code reuse gadgets available in each variant, calculates gadget set utility metrics for these sets,
and provides a comparison of these values across variants.
The results of our study are concerning. Our coarse-grained analysis indicates that the set of
code reuse gadgets found in optimized program variants are significantly more useful to an attacker
than those found in unoptimized variants of the same program. These findings are ubiquitous; we
observed significant negative impacts to gadget sets across all studied compilers, optimization levels,
and benchmarks. Diving deeper, our fine-grained analysis indicates that these impacts cannot be
attributed to a small group of optimizations. While a small number of optimizations were observed
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to have clearly discernible impacts on the resulting gadget set, we also observed that nearly all
optimizations have small but measurable impacts that are predominantly negative.
To answer our last three motivating questions, we conducted differential binary analysis of our
variants to identify and classify the root causes of the negative security impacts we observed in our
experimental data. We identified three general root causes for the negative security impacts we
observed in our study: duplication of gadget producing instructions (GPIs), transformation induced
gadget introduction, and special purpose gadgets introduced as optimizations. Based on our study
of these phenomena, we propose potential mitigation strategies for each.
We implemented our proposed mitigation strategy to combat the negative effects of GPI duplica-
tion by developing two transformation passes for the Egalito binary recompiler [Williams-King
et al. 2020]. Our passes are designed to mitigate undesirable GPI duplication behaviors while pre-
serving the performance benefits originally intended by the compiler. When applied to O3 variants
of our benchmark programs, our passes reduced the total number of useful gadgets available in
transformed binaries by an average of 30.7% and successfully eliminated one or more categories of
special purpose gadgets in half of our variants. Performance analysis of our transformation passes
shows that these benefits can be obtained with negligible impact to execution speed and code size.
The average slowdown observed was 0.28% and the average incremental increase in static code size
caused by our passes was one kilobyte.
1.2 Contributions
We summarize and organize our contributions as follows:
• In Section 4, we present the results of our broad study of the impacts of compiler optimization
on code reuse gadget sets.
• In Section 5, we describe the root causes of the negative impacts we observed in our study.
• In Section 6, we detail the implementation of two binary recompiler passes for mitigating a
number of the negative gadget set effects we observed. Additionally, we present the results
of our experimental analysis of their effects on our benchmark programs.
• In Section 7, we provide a cost-benefit analysis of the performance impacts of our proposed
mitigation passes.
2 BACKGROUND
2.0.1 Gadget-Based Code Reuse Attacks (CRAs). CRA attack methods are designed to defeat code
injection defenses such as W⊕X by using existing executable parts of the vulnerable program
to cause a malicious effect. The canonical CRA example is return-to-libc, in which the attacker
exploits an unprotected memory buffer to redirect execution of a program to a sensitive function
contained within libc. Return-to-libc attacks are limited in expressivity, as they do not inject
arbitrary code but instead rely on the malicious execution of an existing library function. To
overcome this limitation, Shacham [2007] proposed the first gadget-based CRA method, called
Return-Oriented Programming (ROP). In gadget-based CRAs, the attacker exploits a program in a
similar manner to return-to-libc, but rather than redirecting execution to a known function, they
chain together short instruction sequences found in the compromised program called gadgets to
construct a malicious payload. These attack methods have been shown to be Turing-complete if
the attacker has access to a sufficiently expressive set of gadgets, allowing the attacker to construct
and execute an arbitrary program. Several alternative methods to ROP have been introduced, such
as jump and pure call-oriented programming (JOP and COP) [Bletsch et al. 2011b; Checkoway et al.
2010; Sadeghi et al. 2018].
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2.0.2 Gadget Types. A gadget suitable for use in a CRA is a sequence of machine instructions
that end in a return (ROP), indirect jump (JOP), or indirect call (JOP and COP). When chained
together using the control flow properties of the last instruction in each gadget, a sequence of
gadgets is equivalent to an executable program built entirely from existing code segments. Gadgets
are used for one of two purposes in a gadget chain. Functional gadgets are used to perform some
computational task such as adding two values or loading a value into a register from memory. The
attacker uses functional gadgets to express their malicious exploit. Gadgets that are used to perform
critical non-expressive actions such as invoking system calls (i.e., syscall gadgets) or maintaining
gadget chain control flow in JOP and COP exploits are called special purpose gadgets.
2.0.3 Unintended Gadgets. An attacker is not limited to the instructions explicitly generated by
the compiler, called intended gadgets, when building exploit chains. Because x86 instructions are
variable length, an attacker can redirect execution to any byte offset in the program and attempt
to interpret the byte sequence there as a gadget. Due to the density of the x86 encoding space,
programs contain large numbers of gadgets consisting of legal instruction sequences that were
never explicitly generated by the compiler, called unintended gadgets.
2.0.4 Transformation Induced Gadget Introduction. Brown and Pande’s [2019a] prior work on
debloating has shown that software transformations can cause significant changes in both the
quantity and quality of the gadgets present in a transformed binary. Changes to software in its
source code or intermediate representation (IR) are reflected in the downstream binary produced
by the compiler, which can significantly alter the composition of intended gadgets. These changes,
as well as changes in binary layout that occur as a result of transformation, also have significant
impacts on the composition of unintended gadgets. Their work on debloating has determined that
even conservative transformations result in high gadget introduction rates; they showed that an
average of 39.5% of the gadgets present in debloated binaries were not present in the original binary.
2.0.5 Gadget Set Quality Metrics. Three qualitative security-oriented metrics for measuring trans-
formation induced changes in gadget sets have been proposed in prior work [Brown and Pande
2019a,b; Follner et al. 2016; Homescu et al. 2012]. After cataloging gadget sets via static analysis,
these metrics are then calculated via set comparisons to determine the resulting security impact.
Functional gadget set expressivity is a measure of the computational tasks that can be per-
formed with a particular set of gadgets. This metric is calculated by classifying the gadgets in
each set by computation type and then comparing the gadget set’s total expressive power to that
required for Turing-completeness or to construct practical ROP exploits. If a transformation results
in an increase in expressivity, this is considered a negative result.
Functional gadget set quality is a measure of the the overall utility of functional gadgets for
constructing exploit chains. This metric is calculated by analyzing each gadget to determine if it
performs a useful computational task and if it contains extraneous instructions that will interfere
with exploit construction. First, the entire set of gadgets is reduced to only those that encode a useful
computational task and do not contain extraneous instructions that cannot be compensated for,
called useful gadgets. Useful gadgets are then scored based on the number of side constraints they
impose on the exploit chain (e.g., stack pointer manipulations) that must be undone by successive
gadgets. If a transformation increases the number of useful gadgets in a set or decreases the average
number of side constraints across the gadget set, this is considered a negative result.
Special purpose gadget availability is a measure of the types of exploit chains that can be
constructed with a set of gadgets. This metric is calculated by scanning gadget sets to identify
which special purpose gadgets are available, defined as the presence of at least one gadget of a
particular type. If a software transformation introduces types of special purpose gadgets that were
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Table 1. Study Benchmarks
Common Linux Programs SPEC 2006
Bftpd v5.1 gzip v1.10 401.bzip2 433.milc 456.hmmer 470.lbm
libcUrl v7.65.0 httpd v2.4.39 403.gcc 444.namd 458.sjeng 482.sphinx3
git v2.21.0 libsqlite v3.28.0 429.mcf 445.gobmk 462.libquantum
not previously available, this is considered a negative result. If a transformation removes all special
purpose gadgets of a particular type, this is considered a positive result.
3 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
3.0.1 Benchmark Selection. We selected a total of 17 benchmark programs for this study that are
diverse in size, complexity, and functionality. We selected six commonly used Linux programs
and a selection of eleven programs from the SPEC 2006 benchmark set. We selected benchmark
programs from each group that were compatible with our selected compilers (i.e., consist entirely
of C/C++ code) and the Egalito binary recompiler. These programs are displayed in Table 1.
3.0.2 Variant Generation. We used two common production compilers, GCC v7.4.0 and Clang
v8.0.1, to build 1,000 different variants of these benchmark programs for our study. To conduct a
coarse-grained analysis of optimization behavior, we built four variants per benchmark per compiler
at optimization levels O0 through O3. To conduct a fine-grained analysis of optimization behavior,
we built 864 variants that isolate the behavior of individual optimizations. To obtain realistic
variants, we configured the compiler to perform the desired optimization and all optimizations
at levels below the level for which the compiler includes the desired optimization by default. For
example, GCC’s store merging optimization is included as part of O2 by default. To generate a
variant that isolates this behavior, we configured GCC to perform all O1 level optimizations and
the store merging optimization. This is necessary because compiler optimization levels generally
include all of the optimizations performed at lower levels. Also, many optimizations must be run
after other optimizations have already made a pass on the code to be effective. A full list of the
individual optimizations studied is included in Appendix A.1.
3.0.3 Variant Analysis. To determine how each optimization level or individual optimization
impacts the availability and utility of the code reuse gadgets, we analyzed variants against an
appropriate baseline using the Gadget Set Analyzer tool (GSA) [Brown 2020; Brown and Pande
2019a]. For coarse-grained analysis, we compared variants produced at optimization levels O1, O2,
and O3 to unoptimized variants produced at level O0 as the baseline. For fine-grained analysis, we
compared each variant isolating an individual optimization to its subordinate optimization level
variant. Continuing with our previous example, we compared the variant that isolates GCC’s store
merging optimization to the O1 variant. GSA calculates four metrics of interest in our work:
(1) Gadget Introduction Rate: GSA compares gadget sets to determine the percentage of
gadgets found in a variant binary that were not present in the baseline binary.
(2) Functional Gadget Set Expressivity: GSA measures and compares the expressivity of the
ROP gadgets in the baseline and variant binary relative to three expressivity levels: practical
ROP exploits, ASLR-proof practical ROP exploits, and Turing-completeness [Homescu et al.
2012]. Expressivity relative to each level is recorded as the proportion of computational
tasks that can be performed by the set of gadgets to the total number of computational tasks
necessary to achieve full expressivity at that level (11, 35, and 17 respectively).
(3) Functional Gadget Set Quality: GSA first identifies which gadgets in the baseline and
variant binaries are considered useful. Each useful gadget is then scored using an initial score
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of 0 and incrementing the score for each side constraint imposed by extraneous instructions
in the gadget. Finally, GSA measures and compares both the total count of useful gadgets
and the average quality of the useful gadgets for each variant against the baseline.
(4) Special Purpose Gadget Availability:GSA determines and compares the availability of ten
different kinds of special purpose gadgets in the baseline and variant binaries. GSA identifies
system call gadgets, four different types of JOP-specific gadgets [Checkoway et al. 2010;
Homescu et al. 2012], and five different types of COP-specific gadgets [Sadeghi et al. 2018].
4 STUDY RESULTS
We present our study in a top-down manner. We address our first motivating question by measuring
to what degree compiler optimizations introduce new gadgets into optimized binaries in Section
4.1. Next, we address our second motivating question by exploring the coarse-grained impact of
optimization levels on gadget sets in Section 4.2. Next, we address our third motivating question by
exploring the fine-grained impact of individual optimizations on gadget sets in Section 4.3.
4.1 Optimization Induced Gadget Introduction
To answer our first motivating question, we analyzed the gadget sets in our benchmark variants
to determine the rate at which compiler optimizations introduce new gadgets. The results of our
coarse-grained analysis are contained in Table 2. Table 2 contains two sets of grouped columns,
each corresponding to variants produced with a different compiler. The values in each column
represent the total number of code reuse gadgets present within the binary. The percentage in the
parentheses indicates the gadget introduction rate for that variant, calculated as the percentage of
total gadgets present in the optimized variant that are not found in the unoptimized variant.
Our results indicate that the collective effects of compiler optimizations at defined optimization
levels have a large impact on the resulting gadget set. With the exception of the smallest benchmark
programs, over 80% of gadgets found in optimized binaries were newly introduced. In all cases,
more than two-thirds of gadgets found in the optimized binary were newly introduced. These
effects were observed in both compilers and across all optimization levels.
With respect to the total count of gadget present in sets, variants built with GCC at optimization
levels O1 and O2 generally contain a similar number or fewer gadgets than their unoptimized
counterparts. However, eight GCC variants built at the O3 level contained a significantly higher
number of gadgets (greater than a 10% increase). This is not surprising, as optimizations that
perform a code size for speedup tradeoff are typically included at the O3 level in both GCC and
Clang. Such optimizations create optimized copies of code segments which are likely to introduce
new gadgets. Our results were significantly different for Clang, however. Significant increases in
the total number of gadgets present were observed across several optimization levels for all but
one benchmark (401.bzip2). Interestingly, unoptimized variants produced by Clang typically had
smaller gadget sets than GCC, however they were far more likely to be made larger via optimization.
Our fine-grained analysis indicates that individual optimizations also introduce gadgets at a high
rate. Across single optimization variants of our common Linux benchmarks, we observed gadget
introduction rates of 13%, 30.9%, and 31.6% for individual GCC optimizations included at the O1,
O2, and O3 levels respectively. For single-optimization Clang variants, we observed much higher
average gadget introduction rates of 72.5%, 87.5%, and 87.5% for individual optimizations included
at the O1, O2, and O3 levels, respectively.
Whether applied individually or used in aggregate at defined optimization levels, our results
clearly indicate that compiler optimizations have a significant impact on the quantity and composi-
tion of the code reuse gadgets found in the resulting binary. However, gadget count and introduction
rate data is insufficient to draw conclusions about the impact of optimizations on security [Brown
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Table 2. Total Gadgets and Introduction Rate
GCC Clang
Benchmark O0 O1 O2 O3 O0 O1 O2 O3
Bftpd 686 683 (90%) 765 (91%) 781 (91%) 565 654 (91%) 622 (91%) 599 (91%)
libcUrl 7996 7891 (97%) 7670 (97%) 8470 (97%) 6373 7410 (96%) 7743 (96%) 8169 (96%)
git 30210 22424 (96%) 22462 (96%) 22853 (96%) 18259 27697 (97%) 18332 (96%) 19062 (96%)
gzip 1099 921 (88%) 963 (88%) 1052 (89%) 588 879 (90%) 697 (87%) 820 (89%)
httpd 6130 5739 (90%) 6162 (91%) 6954 (92%) 5208 5277 (90%) 5799 (90%) 5516 (90%)
libsqlite 9583 8209 (95%) 8242 (95%) 8658 (95%) 9363 11891 (96%) 10278 (95%) 10690 (96%)
401.bzip2 625 620 (91%) 645 (92%) 778 (93%) 634 643 (91%) 610 (89%) 610 (88%)
403.gcc 34431 27064 (96%) 26114 (96%) 30462 (96%) 18844 23002 (95%) 21874 (94%) 22611 (95%)
429.mcf 294 242 (82%) 228 (79%) 244 (80%) 151 218 (78.4%) 248 (82%) 263 (83%)
433.milc 1306 1388 (93%) 1322 (93%) 1494 (93%) 926 1125 (94%) 1246 (95%) 1368 (95%)
444.namd 1372 962 (92%) 701 (88%) 754 (89%) 599 1316 (95%) 1627 (96%) 1729 (96%)
445.gobmk 8785 9205 (84%) 9041 (84%) 10087 (86%) 6435 7989 (82%) 8056 (82%) 7884 (82%)
456.hmmer 3528 3009 (95%) 2945 (95%) 3375 (95%) 2343 2597 (95%) 2741 (95%) 2833 (95%)
458.sjeng 1239 1348 (93%) 1316 (94%) 1564 (94%) 716 971 (94%) 1068 (94%) 1171 (95%)
462.libquantum 544 524 (90%) 583 (90%) 694 (91%) 352 505 (89%) 569 (91%) 659 (92%)
470.lbm 401 159 (72%) 149 (69%) 172 (73%) 106 164 (77%) 168 (77%) 168 (77%)
482.sphinx3 1945 1777 (95%) 1924 (96%) 2245 (96%) 1187 1635 (95%) 1931 (95%) 2178 (96%)
and Pande 2019a]. Due to the unpredictable nature of the mechanisms by which these gadgets
are introduced and the high rates of introduction observed in our benchmarks, it is likely that the
overall quality of these code reuse gadget sets are similarly impacted.
4.2 Coarse-Grained Gadget Set Impacts
Given these findings, we sought to answer our second motivating question through an analysis
of coarse and fine-grained impacts of optimizations gadget set quality. The results of our coarse-
grained optimization analysis with respect to the three selected gadget set quality metrics follows.
4.2.1 Functional Gadget Set Expressivity. Table 3 contains the data we collected on the expres-
sive power of the functional gadgets within each set. The first column of the table contains the
expressivity level of the baseline variant, which is unoptimized code produced at level O0 for both
compilers. Functional gadget set expressivity data is expressed as a 3-tuple, in which each integer
indicates the number of satisfied computational classes with respect to one of the three selected
expressivity levels, displayed in the following order: practical ROP exploits, ASLR-proof practical
ROP exploits, and Turing-completeness. Following the first column, there are three pairs of columns
containing expressivity data collected for optimized variants produced at levels O1, O2, and O3. In
columns marked with the ∆ symbol, the 3-tuple in parentheses indicates the difference between
the unoptimized and the optimized variants. Negative values in these columns indicate a negative
effect: an increase in the expressive power of the gadget set.
Our data indicates that compiler optimizations overwhelmingly resulted in negative impacts to
security with respect to the expressive power of functional gadget sets. We observed an increase
in expressive power for at least one expressivity level in 96% (98 of 102) of total variants, which
includes all Clang variants. Additionally, we observed that these increases are typically significant
in magnitude and affect all levels of expressivity. In approximately half of the optimized variants,
the number of computational classes satisfied doubled for at least one expressivity level. In 60.8%
of variants (62 of 102), optimization resulted in an increase in expressivity across all three levels.
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Table 3. Coarse-Grained Functional Gadget Set Expressivity
Benchmark O0 O1 ∆O1 O2 ∆O2 O3 ∆O3
Bftpd 6/9/3 6/13/6 (0/-4/-3) 6/12/5 (0/-3/-2) 6/13/6 (0/-4/-3)
libcUrl 7/15/4 9/28/13 (-2/-13/-9) 10/25/13 (-3/-10/-9) 9/28/14 (-2/-13/-10)
git 11/35/16 10/33/16 (1/2/0) 11/33/15 (1/2/1) 11/34/16 (0/1/0)
gzip 6/10/5 7/19/8 (-1/-9/-3) 6/22/11 (0/-12/-6) 8/23/10 (-2/-13/-5)
httpd 9/18/6 8/25/12 (1/-7/-6) 8/24/12 (1/-6/-6) 8/22/11 (1/-4/-5)
libsqlite 7/23/7 9/28/13 (-2/-5/-6) 9/29/14 (-2/-6/-7) 10/30/13 (-3/-7/-6)
401.bzip2 6/8/2 4/11/6 (2/-3/-4) 6/10/5 (0/-2/-3) 5/17/7 (1/-9/-5)
403.gcc 11/31/13 11/35/17 (0/-4/-4) 11/33/15 (0/-2/-2) 11/35/17 (0/-4/-4)
429.mcf 4/7/2 5/9/4 (-1/-2/-2) 5/9/4 (-1/-2/-2) 5/9/4 (-1/-2/-2)
433.milc 7/16/5 6/23/8 (1/-7/-3) 7/26/9 (0/-10/-4) 7/23/8 (0/-7/-3)
444.namd 6/18/6 7/18/4 (-1/0/2) 7/19/5 (-1/-1/1) 8/23/8 (-2/-5/-2)
445.gobmk 7/22/7 8/27/12 (-1/-5/-5) 9/26/13 (-2/-4/-6) 6/30/13 (1/-8/-6)
456.hmmer 7/18/4 9/26/10 (-2/-8/-6) 7/26/9 (0/-8/-5) 7/30/11 (0/-12/-7)
458.sjeng 6/8/7 8/17/8 (-2/-9/-1) 8/17/10 (-2/-9/-3) 8/17/9 (-2/-9/-2)
462.libquantum 6/10/4 5/16/6 (1/-6/-2) 5/17/5 (1/-7/-1) 6/19/7 (0/-9/-3)
470.lbm 4/14/2 4/17/3 (0/-3/-1) 4/15/3 (0/1/1) 4/15/3 (0/-1/-1)
G
C
C
Va
ri
an
ts
482.sphinx3 4/9/3 6/21/7 (-2/-12/-4) 9/23/10 (-5/-14/-7) 9/27/12 (-5/-18/-9)
Bftpd 5/12/4 6/21/7 (-1/-9/-3) 6/20/5 (-1/-8/-1) 6/23/6 (-1/-11/-2)
libcUrl 4/16/7 8/28/13 (-4/-12/-6) 10/29/13 (-6/-13/-6) 8/30/13 (-4/-14/-6)
git 10/34/13 11/33/15 (-1/1/-2) 11/34/16 (-1/0/-3) 11/34/16 (-1/0/-3)
gzip 3/6/2 6/22/9 (-3/-16/-7) 5/18/5 (-2/-12/-3) 5/20/6 (-2/-14/-4)
httpd 5/14/4 9/25/11 (-4/-11/-7) 9/30/12 (-4/-16/-8) 9/25/9 (-4/-11/-5)
libsqlite 6/17/8 11/32/15 (-5/-15/-7) 9/29/13 (-3/-12/-5) 9/28/13 (-3/-11/-5)
401.bzip2 5/6/2 7/18/4 (-2/-12/-2) 6/20/5 (-1/-14/-3) 6/17/4 (-1/-11/-2)
403.gcc 11/31/13 11/33/16 (0/-2/-3) 10/33/16 (1/-2/-3) 11/35/17 (0/-4/-4)
429.mcf 3/5/2 6/10/6 (-3/-5/-4) 6/10/6 (-3/-5/-4) 6/10/6 (-3/-5/-4)
433.milc 5/7/4 6/21/7 (-1/-14/-3) 7/22/8 (-2/-15/-4) 7/23/8 (-2/-16/-4)
444.namd 3/9/2 7/22/10 (-4/-13/-8) 7/25/9 (-4/-16/-7) 8/24/9 (-5/-15/-7)
445.gobmk 5/22/9 10/31/15 (-5/-9/-6) 10/31/14 (-5/-9/-5) 9/31/13 (-4/-9/-4)
456.hmmer 7/12/6 8/25/9 (-1/-13/-3) 7/29/12 (0/-17/-6) 8/29/12 (-1/-17/-6)
458.sjeng 5/6/1 8/24/10 (-3/-18/-9) 7/24/9 (-2/-18/-8) 7/23/9 (-2/-17/-8)
462.libquantum 3/13/4 6/20/7 (-3/-7/-3) 6/22/6 (-3/-9/-2) 5/21/7 (-2/-8/-3)
470.lbm 3/5/1 3/17/4 (0/-12/-3) 3/16/4 (0/-11/-3) 3/13/3 (0/-8/-2)
C
la
ng
Va
ri
an
ts
482.sphinx3 5/11/5 6/23/11 (-1/-12/-6) 9/29/12 (-4/-18/-7) 8/26/11 (-3/-15/-6)
4.2.2 Functional Gadget Set Quality. Table 4 contains the data we collected on the number of
useful functional gadgets within each set and their average quality. The first column of the table
contains the expressivity level of the baseline variant, which is unoptimized code produced at level
O0 for both compilers. Functional gadget set quality data is expressed as a 2-tuple, in which the
first integer indicates the number of useful functional gadgets found within the set and the second
value indicates the average quality score of the gadgets in the set. Following the first column, there
are three pairs of columns containing quality data collected for optimized variants produced at
levels O1, O2, and O3. In columns marked with the ∆ symbol, the 2-tuple in parentheses indicates
the difference between the unoptimized and the optimized variants. Negative values for the first
item in the 2-tuple indicate a negative effect: an increase in the number of the useful gadgets in
the set. Higher average gadget set quality scores indicate gadget sets with a higher number of side
constraints; as such, positive values for the second item in the 2-tuple indicate a negative effect: a
decrease in the average number of side constraints present in the gadgets that make up the set.
Our data indicates compiler optimizations have impacts on functional gadget set quality data
that are similar in frequency and severity to functional gadget set expressivity. In 73.5% (75 of 102)
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Table 4. Coarse-Grained Functional Gadget Set Quality
Benchmark O0 O1 ∆O1 O2 ∆O2 O3 ∆O3
Bftpd 268 / 1.04 302 / 0.86 (-34 / 0.17) 333 / 0.94 (-65 / .09) 347 / 0.91 (-79 / .012)
libcUrl 3987 / 0.97 3544 / 0.86 (443 / 0.11) 3959 / 0.73 (28 / 0.23) 4284 / 0.7 (-297 / 0.26)
git 12555 / 1.1 8058 / 0.91 (4497 / 0.19) 8018 / 0.93 (4537 / 0.18) 7401 / 0.88 (5154 / 0.23)
gzip 431 / 1.07 358 / 0.85 (73 / 0.22) 416 / 0.99 (15 / 0.08) 401 / 0.89 (30 / 0.18)
httpd 2725 / 1.03 2512 / 0.81 (213 / 0.22) 2899 / 0.86 (-174 / 0.17) 3278 / 0.81 (-553 / 0.22)
libsqlite 268 / 1.04 302 / 0.86 (-34 / 0.17) 333 / 0.94 (-65 / 0.09) 347 / 0.91 (-79 / 0.12)
401.bzip2 238 / 0.98 211 / 0.83 (27 / 0.16) 242 / 0.76 (-4 / 0.22) 301 / 0.73 (-63 / 0.26)
403.gcc 11165 / 1.04 8799 / 0.85 (2366 / 0.19) 9389 / 0.86 (1776 / 0.17) 10601 / 0.85 (564 / 0.18)
429.mcf 90 / 0.93 112 / 0.84 (-22 / 0.08) 107 / 0.79 (-17 / 0.13) 104 / 0.73 (-14 / 0.2)
433.milc 512 / 1 491 / 0.98 (21 / 0.02) 507 / 0.89 (5 / 0.11) 616 / 0.8 (-104 / 0.19)
444.namd 358 / 0.98 274 / 0.69 (84 / 0.3) 264 / 0.7 (94 / 0.28) 320 / 0.7 (38 / 0.28)
445.gobmk 3799 / 1 4154 / 0.88 (-355 / 0.12) 4024 / 0.87 (-225 / 0.17) 4533 / 0.94 (-734 / 0.07)
456.hmmer 1087 / 1.12 1224 / 0.89 (-137 / 0.23) 1215 / 0.86 (-128 / 0.26) 1338 / 0.82 (-251 / 0.3)
458.sjeng 426 / 0.87 476 / 0.68 (-50 / 0.19) 489 / 0.7 (-63 / 0.17) 623 / 0.67 (-197 / 0.2)
462.libquantum 225 / 1.11 222 / 0.82 (3 / 0.3) 233 / 0.7 (-8 / 0.4) 267 / 0.7 (-42 / 0.41)
470.lbm 75 / 1.05 93 / 0.84 (-18 / 0.21) 83 / 0.77 (-8 / 0.28) 86 / 0.81 (-11 / 0.23)
G
C
C
Va
ri
an
ts
482.sphinx3 730 / 1.17 679 / 0.93 (51 / 0.24) 748 / 0.85 (-18 / 0.32) 867 / 0.77 (-137 / 0.4)
Bftpd 295 / 1.12 339 / 0.92 (-44 / 0.2) 325 / 1 (-30 / 0.12) 337 / 0.9 (-42 / 0.22)
libcUrl 3324 / 1 3906 / 0.7 (-582 / 0.3) 4045 / 0.68 (-721 / 0.32) 4258 / 0.68 (-934 / 0.32)
git 8235 / 1.05 12155 / 0.78 (-3920 / 0.28) 6956 / 0.83 (1279 / 0.23) 6974 / 0.79 (1261 / 0.27)
gzip 278 / 1.04 390 / 0.86 (-112 / 0.18) 248 / 0.81 (30 / 0.23) 292 / 0.73 (-14 / 0.31)
httpd 2575 / 0.93 2689 / 0.7 (-114 / 0.24) 2764 / 0.72 (-189 / 0.21) 2619 / 0.7 (-44 / 0.24)
libsqlite 3508 / 1 4540 / 0.74 (-1032 / 0.26) 3007 / 0.68 (501 / 0.32) 3322 / 0.7 (186 / 0.3)
401.bzip2 220 / 0.85 268 / 0.77 (-48 / 0.08) 247 / 0.77 (-27 / 0.08) 208 / 0.75 (12 / 0.1)
403.gcc 8140 / 0.94 9142 / 0.82 (-1002 / 0.11) 8328 / 0.79 (-188 / 0.15) 8635 / 0.81 (-495 / 0.12)
429.mcf 114 / 0.98 105 / 0.94 (9 / 0.04) 120 / 0.94 (-6 / 0.04) 123 / 0.95 (-9 / 0.03)
433.milc 380 / 1.05 455 / 0.82 (-75 / 0.23) 489 / 0.82 (-109 / 0.23) 522 / 0.8 (-142 / 0.25)
444.namd 280 / 0.91 475 / 0.73 (-195 / 0.18) 484 / 0.66 (-204 / 0.25) 525 / 0.64 (-245 / 0.26)
445.gobmk 3165 / 0.96 3963 / 0.8 (-771 / 0.16) 3861 / 0.84 (-696 / 0.12) 3767 / 0.81 (-602 / 0.15)
456.hmmer 929 / 1.11 1024 / 0.86 (-95 / 0.25) 1044 / 0.87 (-115 / 0.24) 1037 / 0.84 (-108 / 0.27)
458.sjeng 347 / 0.89 410 / 0.84 (-63 / 0.05) 445 / 0.75 (-98 / 0.14) 463 / 0.79 (-116 / 0.1)
462.libquantum 173 / 1.01 265 / 0.8 (-92 / 0.21) 261 / 0.8 (-88 / 0.2) 267 / 0.82 (-94 / 0.19)
470.lbm 64 / 1.04 89 / 0.86 (-25 / 0.18) 89 / 0.88 (-25 / 0.16) 86 / 1.04 (-22 / 0)
C
la
ng
Va
ri
an
ts
482.sphinx3 608 / 1.12 663 / 0.95 (-55 / 0.17) 715 / 0.79 (-107 / 0.33) 772 / 0.82 (-164 / 0.3)
of variants, optimization increased the number of useful ROP, JOP, and COP gadgets. In 88.2% (90 of
102) of variants, optimizations caused the average quality score of the gadget set to improve from
the attacker’s perspective by a significant degree (defined as a reduction by at least 0.1). Further,
we observed no instances where optimization worsened the average quality score of the gadget set
from the attacker’s perspective by a significant degree.
4.2.3 Special Purpose Gadget Availability. Table 5 contains the data we collected on the categories
of special purpose gadgets available within each set. The first column of this table contains the
number of categories available in the baseline variant, which is unoptimized code produced at
level O0 for both compilers. Availability data is expressed as a single integer indicating the number
of categories of special purpose gadgets with at least one gadget present within the gadget set.
Following the first column, there are three pairs of columns containing expressivity data collected
for optimized variants produced at levels O1, O2, and O3. In columns marked with the ∆ symbol,
the integer in parentheses indicates the difference between the unoptimized and the optimized
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Table 5. Coarse-Grained Special Purpose Gadget Availability
GCC Clang
Benchmark O0 O1 ∆O1 O2 ∆O2 O3 ∆O3 O0 O1 ∆O1 O2 ∆ O2 O3 ∆ O3
Bftpd 1 1 (0) 1 (0) 2 (-1) 1 1 (0) 1 (0) 2 (-1)
libcUrl 4 4 (0) 4 (0) 4 (0) 4 4 (0) 4 (0) 4 (0)
git 6 6 (0) 6 (0) 5 (1) 6 6 (0) 6 (0) 5 (1)
gzip 1 1 (0) 2 (-1) 3 (-2) 1 1 (0) 2 (-1) 3 (-2)
httpd 6 3 (3) 5 (1) 5 (1) 6 3 (3) 5 (1) 5 (1)
libsqlite 5 4 (1) 4 (1) 4 (1) 5 4 (1) 4 (1) 4 (1)
401.bzip2 1 1 (0) 1 (0) 1 (0) 1 1 (0) 1 (0) 1 (0)
403.gcc 6 6 (0) 6 (0) 6 (0) 6 6 (0) 6 (0) 6 (0)
429.mcf 1 1 (0) 1 (0) 2 (0) 1 1 (0) 1 (0) 2 (0)
433.milc 2 2 (0) 1 (1) 1 (1) 2 2 (0) 1 (1) 1 (1)
444.namd 2 2 (0) 1 (1) 2 (0) 2 2 (0) 1 (1) 2 (0)
445.gobmk 4 5 (-1) 5 (-1) 6 (-2) 4 5 (-1) 5 (-1) 6 (-2)
456.hmmer 3 2 (1) 3 (0) 2 (1) 3 2 (1) 3 (0) 2 (1)
458.sjeng 2 1 (1) 2 (0) 2 (0) 2 1 (1) 2 (0) 2 (0)
462.libquantum 1 1 (0) 1 (0) 1 (0) 1 1 (0) 1 (0) 1 (0)
470.lbm 1 1 (0) 1 (0) 1 (0) 1 1 (0) 1 (0) 1 (0)
482.sphinx3 1 1 (0) 1 (0) 2 (-1) 1 1 (0) 1 (0) 2 (-1)
variants. Negative values in these columns indicate a negative effect: an increase in the number of
special purpose gadget types present in the gadget set.
We observed overall negative impacts on special purpose gadget availability in 13.7% (14 of 102)
of total variants and overall positive effects in 25.5% (26 of 102) of total variants. In the majority of
variants we did not observe overall changes, due in part to the relatively small population of special
purpose gadgets in our benchmarks and the calculation methodology for this metric. An overall
result of no change is possible in situations where the number of gadget types eliminated is offset
by introduction of an equal number of other types. A detailed analysis of the specific categories
gadgets present in our variants reveals that optimizations introduced at least one new type of
special purpose gadget that was not originally generated by the compiler in approximately half of
variants. The most frequently introduced special purpose gadgets were syscall gadgets, which are
particularly dangerous and versatile special purpose gadgets. These gadgets are useful in ROP, JOP,
and COP attacks for performing sensitive actions, such as executing programs like a system shell.
4.2.4 Discussion. Our coarse-grained analysis results indicate that the sets of gadgets available in
optimized program variants are significantly more useful for constructing CRA exploits than the
sets found in unoptimized variants. Interestingly, our data indicates that security impacts do not
follow a linear progression and are not significantly impacted by the input program. Negative gadget
set impacts observed in our study did not increase with the complexity or cost of optimizations and
significant impacts were observed for all optimization levels, across all benchmarks and for both
compilers (more so for Clang). We conclude from this observation that avoiding negative security
impacts on CRA gadget sets is not as simple as selecting a particular optimization level.
4.3 Fine-Grained Gadget Set Impacts
In order to answer our third motivating question, we conducted a fine-grained analysis of gadget
set impacts by generating 864 different single-optimization variants of our benchmarks. Although
single optimization variants were built for all benchmarks, fine-grained analysis variants were
predominantly built from the common Linux program benchmark set. Tables of the individual
optimizations used to generate these variants can be found in A.1. Using the coarse-grained
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variants produced at levels O0, O1, and O2 as baselines where appropriate, we analyzed our single
optimization variants using GSA to isolate their effects on the resulting gadget sets.
4.3.1 General Observations. As was observed at coarse-grained optimization levels, our fine-
grained variants exhibited a variety of negative impacts on resulting gadget sets according to our
metrics. Negative impacts in the form of increases in gadget set expressivity, gadget set quality,
and special purpose gadget availability were commonly observed across all benchmarks, isolated
optimizations, and compilers; though these impacts were observed with more variability in our
single optimization variants than our optimization level variants.
In the majority of single optimization variants, negative effects were relatively small in magnitude,
manifesting as gadget set expressivity increases of less than three computational classes, an increase
of less than 5% in the number of useful gadgets, or the introduction of one type of special purpose
gadget (usually syscall, JOP data loader, or COP intra-stack pivot gadgets). Similar small magnitude
positive impacts on gadget set metrics were also observed across our single optimization variants,
albeit at a lower incidence rate than negative impacts. Brown and Pande’s [2019a] work suggests that
transformation induced gadget introduction is responsible for the majority of the small magnitude
gadget set impacts we observed in our single-optimization variants. We detail our investigation of
this potential root cause of the "background noise" we observed in Section 5.3.
4.3.2 Outlier Detection. Within this background noise, we observed a number of individual op-
timizations with negative impacts that were significantly larger in magnitude. To separate these
instances for deeper analysis, we performed outlier detection across our single optimization variant
data. We define outliers as single optimization variants with gadget set metric result changes from
the baseline variant greater than 1.5 times the standard deviation from the mean gadget set metric
result change on a per benchmark, per metric basis. This definition is shown in Equation 1, where
A is set to 1.5, the mean variant result change is denoted by µ, the standard deviation of variant
result changes is denoted by σ , and individual optimization result changes are denoted by ∆r es .
(µ −Aσ ) ≰ ∆r es ≰ (µ +Aσ ) (1)
For each combination of benchmark and gadget set metric, we analyzed the GSA results to
identify individual optimizations with results considered outliers. We then combined the total list
of identified outliers across all benchmarks and metrics and constructed a histogram to identify
which isolated optimizations resulted in outlier results most frequently, and for which specific
metrics they produce outlier results. Our outlier detection process identified the following isolated
optimizations as frequently producing outlier gadget set impacts:
(1) Omit Frame Pointer (GCC -fomit-frame-pointer): Produces frequent outlier results
across all three metrics.
(2) Interprocedural Constant Propagation FunctionCloning (GCC -fipa-cp-clone): Pro-
duces frequent outlier results with respect to functional gadget set expressivity.
(3) Jump Following Common Subexpression Elimination (GCC -fcse-follow-jumps):
Produces frequent outlier results with respect to special purpose gadget introduction.
(4) Tail Call Elimination (Clang --tail-call-elim): Produces frequent outlier results with
respect to special purpose gadget introduction.
(5) Peephole Optimizations (GCC -fpeephole2): Produces frequent outlier results with re-
spect to special purpose gadget introduction.
4.3.3 Outlier Analysis. Tables 6 and 7 contain the subset of our fine-grained analysis relevant to
the optimizations identified as frequently producing outliers. Table 6 contains analyzer data across
all three metrics for GCC’s omit frame pointer optimization. This optimization causes marked
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Table 6. GCC Omit-Frame-Pointer Single Optimization Variant Gadget Set Impacts
Functional Gadget
Set Expressivity
Functional Gadget
Set Quality
S.P. Gadget
Availability
Benchmark O0 Opt ∆Opt O0 Opt ∆Opt O0 Opt ∆Opt
Bftpd 6/9/3 8/16/5 (-2/-7/-2) 268 / 1.04 287 / 0.74 (-19 / 0.3) 1 1 (0)
libcUrl 7/15/4 9/22/7 (-2/-7/-3) 3987 / 0.97 3595 / 0.86 (392 / 0.1) 4 6 (-2)
git 11/35/16 11/33/16 (0/2/0) 12555 / 1.1 8351 / 1.06 (4204 / 0.04) 5 5 (0)
gzip 6/10/5 7/17/5 (-1/-7/0) 431 / 1.07 365 / 0.92 (66 / 0.15) 1 1 (0)
httpd 9/18/6 7/21/8 (2/-3/-2) 2725 / 1.03 2288 / 0.87 (437 / 0.16) 6 3 (3)
libsqlite 7/23/7 8/23/10 (-1/0/-3) 4200 / 1.1 3724 / 0.93 (476 / 0.17) 5 2 (3)
401.bzip2 6/8/2 5/14/4 (1/-6/-2) 238 / 0.98 244 / 0.72 (-6 / 0.27) 1 1 (0)
403.gcc 11/31/13 11/31/14 (0/0/-1) 11070 / 1.04 9639 / 0.88 (1431 / 0.16) 5 5 (0)
429.mcf 4/7/2 5/13/3 (-1/-6/-1) 90 / 0.93 85 / 0.69 (5 / 0.23) 1 1 (0)
433.milc 7/16/5 7/19/7 (0/-3/-2) 512 / 1 473 / 0.74 (39 / 0.26) 2 2 (0)
444.namd 6/18/6 7/20/8 (-1/-2/-2) 358 / 0.98 319 / 0.72 (39 / 0.26) 2 1 (1)
445.gobmk 7/22/7 9/27/11 (-2/-5/-4) 3797 / 1 3529 / 0.82 (268 / 0.18) 4 5 (-1)
456.hmmer 7/18/4 7/21/9 (0/-3/-5) 1087 / 1.12 1122 / 0.88 (-35 / 0.23) 3 1 (2)
458.sjeng 6/8/7 7/21/9 (-1/-13/-2) 426 / 0.87 461 / 0.57 (-35 / 0.31) 2 3 (-1)
462.libquantum 6/10/4 5/14/4 (1/-4/0) 225 / 1.11 199 / 0.72 (26 / 0.39) 1 1 (0)
470.lbm 4/14/2 3/12/2 (1/2/0) 75 / 1.05 77 / 0.79 (-2 / 0.26) 1 1 (0)
482.sphinx3 4/9/3 8/17/6 (-4/-8/-3) 730 / 1.17 648 / 0.93 (82 / 0.24) 1 1 (0)
increases in functional gadget set expressivity across 82.4% (14 of 17) of variants. Interestingly, this
optimization did not have similar effects on functional gadget set quality. We observed that this
optimization significantly reduced the number of useful gadgets present in the resulting variant
in 64.7% (11 of 17) of our benchmarks. With respect to special purpose gadget availability, this
optimization introduced new categories of special purpose gadgets in three benchmarks, but was
also observed to eliminate existing categories of gadgets in four benchmarks.
Table 7 contains analyzer data for optimizations with a single metric observed to exhibit a high
frequency of outliers. GCC’s interprocedural constant propagation function cloning optimization
was observed to havemixed impacts on functional gadget set expressivitywith expressivity increases
and decreases occurring at roughly the same rate across all benchmarks. GCC’s jump following CSE
and peephole optimizations were observed to frequently introduce new types of special purpose
gadgets. The most frequently observed gadgets introduced were syscall and COP intra-stack pivot
gadgets. In contrast to these observations, Clang’s tail call elimination optimization had a number
of positive impacts on special purpose gadget availability, eliminating one or more types of special
purpose gadgets in 35.3% (6 of 17) of variants. However, this optimization was also observed to
introduce new types of special purpose gadgets in 23.5% (4 of 17) of variants. Deeper analysis of
this unexpected result reveals this optimization frequently eliminates COP-specific special purpose
gadgets, but was also observed to introduce new JOP dataloader gadgets at a high rate. The ultimate
effect of the optimization (positive or negative) largely depends on the types of special purpose
gadgets present in the baseline variant; for example, baseline variants without JOP dataloader
or COP-specific gadget types are likely to suffer the negative impact of JOP dataloader gadgets
introduction without a corresponding benefit of COP-specific gadget elimination.
4.3.4 Discussion. We draw two high-level conclusions from our fine-grained analysis of compiler
optimization behaviors. First, our data indicates that nearly all optimizations have a small but
measurable impact on the composition of the resulting gadget set. The majority of these impacts
were observed to be negative, though positive impacts were also observed at lower frequency.
12
Understanding and Mitigating Impacts of Optimizations on Gadget Sets
Table 7. Single Optimization Variants with Outliers in One Metric
IPA CP Clone - GCC [1] CSE FollowJumps - GCC
Tail Call
Elimination - Clang Peephole - GCC
Benchmark O2 Opt ∆Opt O1 Opt ∆Opt O0 Opt ∆Opt O0 Opt ∆Opt
Bftpd 6/12/5 6/13/6 (0/-1/-1) 1 1 (0) 1 1 (0) 1 1 (0)
libcUrl 10/25/13 9/24/12 (1/1/1) 4 5 (-1) 4 5 (-1) 4 5 (-1)
git 11/33/15 11/31/14 (0/2/1) 6 6 (0) 6 3 (3) 6 6 (0)
gzip 6/22/11 6/24/12 (0/-2/-1) 1 2 (-1) 1 1 (0) 1 1 (0)
httpd 8/24/12 9/27/13 (-1/-3/-1) 3 4 (-1) 5 4 (1) 3 4 (-1)
libsqlite 9/29/14 9/27/13 (0/2/1) 4 6 (-2) 5 3 (2) 4 6 (-2)
401.bzip2 6/10/5 5/9/4 (1/1/1) 1 1 (0) 1 1 (0) 1 1 (0)
403.gcc 11/33/15 11/34/16 (0/-1/-1) 6 6 (0) 5 6 (-1) 6 6 (0)
429.mcf 5/9/4 5/9/4 (0/0/0) 1 1 (0) 1 1 (0) 1 1 (0)
433.milc 7/26/9 7/24/9 (0/2/0) 2 2 (0) 2 1 (1) 2 2 (0)
444.namd 7/19/5 7/19/5 (0/0/0) 2 2 (0) 1 1 (0) 2 2 (0)
445.gobmk 9/26/13 7/24/12 (2/2/1) 5 5 (0) 5 3 (2) 5 6 (-1)
456.hmmer 7/26/9 7/26/9 (0/0/0) 2 2 (0) 3 4 (-1) 2 4 (-2)
458.sjeng 8/17/10 8/17/10 (0/0/0) 1 2 (-1) 1 2 (-1) 1 1 (0)
462.libquantum 5/17/5 5/17/5 (0/0/0) 1 1 (0) 1 1 (0) 1 1 (0)
470.lbm 4/15/3 4/15/3 (0/0/0) 1 1 (0) 1 1 (0) 1 1 (0)
482.sphinx3 9/23/10 9/22/9 (0/1/1) 1 1 (0) 2 1 (1) 1 1 (0)
1 Functional gadget set expressivity data is displayed for IPA CP Clone (GCC). For all other single optimization variants, special purpose
gadget availability data is displayed.
This conclusion is consistent with the findings of our coarse-grained analysis; it suggests that
the high levels of negative gadget set impacts observed at predefined optimization levels are the
conglomeration of smaller magnitude impacts made by individual optimizations rather than a
small group of optimizations with high magnitude impacts. Second, we conclude that a relatively
small number of isolated optimizations have gadget set impacts that are clearly discernible from
the background noise. This conclusion is promising as it suggests that there are relatively few
undesirable behaviors in existing optimizations that are negatively impacting gadget sets.
5 ROOT CAUSES
To answer our fourth motivating question, we performed differential binary analysis of our single
optimization variants and their respective baseline variants determine the underlying causes for the
negative impacts we observed. We did not exhaustively analyze all 864 of our single optimization
variants as this would be intractable; we focused our efforts on optimizations that were observed to
have frequent outlier gadget set impacts including but not limited to those identified in Section 4.3.
In addition to searching for root causes of these outliers, we also sought to confirm our hypothesis
that transformation induced gadget introduction is the underlying cause for the small magnitude
changes in gadget set metrics we observed across our single optimization variants.
We used a number of automated tools in support of our manual differential binary analysis
efforts. To identify and observe the after-effects of localized transformations performed by individual
optimizations, we used the commercial disassembler IDA Pro [Hex-Rays 2020] and one of its plugins,
BinDiff [zynamics 2020]. BinDiff uses a number of heuristics to match functions in different versions
of the same program, enabling a visual before and after side-by-side comparison of the program’s
control flow graphs (CFGs). To ensure that the disassembly process produced precise CFG recovery,
we built all of our program variants with full debugging metadata.
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In the course of our analysis, we identified three mechanisms that result in negative impacts to
gadget sets. The nature of these mechanisms varies widely, and the potential mitigation strategies
to combat them vary widely as well. In the following subsections, we detail these mechanisms, the
optimizations we observe that employ them, and potential mitigation strategies.
5.1 Duplication of Gadget Producing Instructions
Gadget search algorithms employed by tools such as ROPgadget [Salwan 2020] search binaries
for byte sequences that encode return, indirect jump, indirect call, and system call instructions,
which we refer to as gadget-producing instructions (GPIs). This search captures both GPI byte
sequences intentionally inserted by the compiler (e.g., return instructions terminating functions) as
well as sequences that are unintentionally encoded in headers, data sections, memory locations,
constants, displacements in control-flow instructions, etc. For each GPI byte sequence found, the
algorithm attempts to disassemble the bytes preceding the GPI to determine if they encode valid x86
instructions. If successful, the algorithm catalogs the valid sequence of bytes and the GPI encoding
as a gadget. This is done iteratively, with each iteration attempting to disassemble a longer byte
prefix to the GPI until the length of the found gadgets exceeds some useful threshold (e.g., 10 bytes
in length for ROPgadget). This process identifies all intended and unintended gadgets at or below
the threshold associated with each GPI, which collectively forms the binary’s gadget set.
When compiler optimizations duplicate GPIs, they provide new opportunities for an attacker to
find gadgets within a program. Due to the density of the x86_64 instruction set and its support for
variable length instructions, each duplicated GPI is likely to introduce new, unique, and potentially
useful gadgets. Unfortunately, a number of compiler optimizations increase performance by selec-
tively duplicating code. These optimizations are typically only employed at the O3 level because
code duplication increases the size of optimized binaries, however there are some notable exceptions.
For example, both GCC and Clang perform inlining behavior at level O2 and above, in which a
function call is replaced with the body of the called function. This allows other optimizations that
are intra-procedural to optimize caller and callee code in ways that would not be possible without
inlining. If the inlined function contains GPIs, these GPIs are duplicated. Due to the impacts of other
optimizations and code layout on the combined code, the duplicated GPIs are likely to introduce
new unique gadgets. Our differential analysis reveals that this behavior is indeed responsible for
introducing new gadgets at higher optimization levels, partially explaining the negative impacts
we observed in our coarse-grained analysis at levels O2 and O3.
Interestingly, our analysis revealed that this behavior also occurs with a number of GCC-specific
optimizations that are employed at the O1 level. GPI duplication was most apparent for GCC’s
omit frame pointer optimization, which identifies functions that do not require a frame pointer
and eliminates pointer setup and restore instructions from the function prologue and epilogue
respectively. Due to GCC’s code generation conventions, the pointer restore instruction (pop rbp;)
is typically the lone instruction executed prior to a function’s retn instruction. In cases where
multiple code paths converge at the end of a function, eliminating the pointer restore instruction
allows the return instruction to be hoisted to the end of each converging path. While this technique
slightly reduces code size and execution time per path by replacing a 5-byte jmp instruction with
a copy of the single byte retn instruction it targets, each duplicated retn instruction potentially
introduces new useful gadgets. An example of this phenomenon in httpd is shown in Figure 1.
In the GCC variants we observed, we discovered that this behavior is not limited to the frame
pointer omission optimization. We also observed this behavior with GCC’s shrink wrap and tree
switch conversion optimizations. Additionally, this behavior is not limited to retn instructions.
Although rare, it is possible for indirect calls and jumps to be duplicated by optimizations for
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mov eax, 0
jmp 0x6D0BA
mov rax, [ap_module_short_names]
mov edx, [rsp-4]
movsxd rdx, edx
shl rdx, 3
add rax, rdx
mov rax, [rax]
retn
O0 Optimization
ap_find_module_short_name()
O0 + Omit Frame Pointer Optimizations
ap_find_module_short_name()
mov rax, [ap_module_short_names]
mov edx, [rbp-4]
movsxd rdx, edx
shl rdx, 3
add rax, rdx
mov rax, [rax]
pop rbp
retn
mov eax, 0
retn
Fig. 1. GPI Duplication caused by GCC’s Frame Pointer Omission Optimization
functions that end in another function call (i.e., a tail call). We did not observe this behavior in
Clang’s equivalent optimizations due to differences in how Clang generates function epilogues.
The negative effects of optimizations exhibiting this behavior occur indirectly as a result of an
aggressive secondary optimization. Since a number of different optimizations exhibit this behavior,
this behavior is most simply mitigated through transformation pass(es) that merge duplicated GPIs.
We detail our implementation of such transformations and their effects in Section 6.
5.2 Special Purpose Gadgets Introduced as Optimizations
Complex CRA methodologies such as JOP and COP require a number of special purpose gadgets to
perform important non-functional tasks in exploit chains. One such type, the JOP dataloader gadget,
consists of an indirect jump preceded by a popa or multiple pop instructions. This special purpose
gadget is useful for loading data injected into the stack that is necessary for the attacker’s exploit into
registers at the beginning of a JOP exploit. Our analysis of Clang’s tail call elimination optimization
revealed that the utility of this instruction sequence is not limited to exploit programming. This
optimization identifies functions in which the final action is to call another function. In these cases,
the caller’s stack frame is no longer needed and can be reused by the callee. The optimization will
replace the tail call instruction and the function terminating return instruction with a jump to the
called function, eliminating the operations necessary to set up a new stack frame. When the tail
call to be eliminated is an indirect call, it is replaced with an indirect jump. With respect to code
reuse gadgets, the net result of this operation is the elimination of call-ending gadgets that are
useful in JOP and COP exploit patterns and the introduction of jump-ending gadgets that are used
in JOP exploit patterns only. Return-ending gadgets will also be eliminated if the indirect jump
replaces the return instruction completely, although this only occurs if the tail call occurs on all
paths to the return instruction.
However, Clang’s code generation conventions for function epilogues typically include several
pop instructions to restore the values of callee-saved registers (i.e., RBX, RBP, R12-R15) before
returning control-flow to the calling function. When the function-terminating return instruction
preceded by these pop instructions is replaced by an indirect jump, JOP dataloader gadgets are
produced. An example of this behavior in httpd is shown in Figure 2.
In this case, the sequence of instructions representing the JOP dataloader gadget is intentionally
placed by the compiler. The introduction of these gadgets cannot be avoided without forgoing
the benefits of the optimization; either wholesale by disabling tail call elimination when building
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mov edi, 0xC
add rsp, 8
pop rbx
pop rbp
pop r12
pop r13
jmp rax
O0 Optimization
ap_varbuf_grow()
O0 + Tail Call Elimination Optimizations
ap_varbuf_grow()
mov edi, 0xC
call rax
jmp 0x3BF10
add rsp, 8
pop rbx
pop rbp
pop r12
pop r13
retn
add rsp, 8
pop rbx
pop rbp
pop r12
pop r13
retn
Fig. 2. Special Purpose Gadget Introduction caused by Clang’s Tail Call Elimination Optimization
software or piecemeal with a security-sensitive version of the optimization that does not apply
the transformation to indirect calls. The cost-benefit analysis of such a strategy will vary from
application to application. As such, the decision to use this optimization is left to the individual
building the code, as is the case with other compiler optimizations that can introduce security
weaknesses (e.g., dead store elimination).
5.3 Transformation Induced Gadget Introduction
Prior work has shown that software transformation induces a significant amount of gadget intro-
duction, even for relatively small transformations. Our analysis of single optimization variants
generated by both GCC and Clang revealed that compiler optimizations also introduce a significant
number of new gadgets when performing seemingly innocuous transformations. Changes to the
code that precedes compiler-placed GPIs is the most readily apparent driver for changes in both
intended and unintended gadgets available in optimized variants. However, optimization also
induces changes in the optimized variant’s layout which introduce a significant number of new,
potentially useful unintended gadgets.
Layout-based unintended gadgets are primarily introduced by displacement or offset encodings
for control flow instructions like unconditional jumps, conditional jumps, and function calls. If
bytes corresponding to GPIs are found within these encodings, they can be used as a source of
unintended gadgets. When optimizations make semantic changes to the program representation,
they often introduce a number of layout changes as well, potentially altering a previously benign
encoding to one containing a GPI. An example of this behavior in libcUrl is shown in Figure 3. In
this figure, a conditional jump instruction with a short (1 byte) displacement is converted into an
equivalent conditional jump instruction with a near (4-byte) displacement. This new displacement
includes the byte value 0xC3, which is the encoding for the retn GPI. This behavior is not limited
to retn GPIs. We also observed that layout-based introduction was responsible for the introduction
of syscall and COP intra-stack pivot special purpose gadgets, although this was observed less
frequently because their encodings are multi-byte, like indirect jump and call GPIs.
We observed that changes in layout-based unintended gadgets were responsible for a significant
amount of the "background noise" we observed in optimized variants. Given that this type of
gadget introduction is endemic to the x86_64 instruction set architecture, it is outside the control
(and concern) of the compiler’s machine-independent optimizations. As such, it is not possible for
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48 8D 05 B9 1A 24 00
48 8B 00
48 8B 95 60 FF FF FF
48 89 D7
FF D0
48 89 C2
48 8B 85 28 FF FF FF
48 89 10
48 8B 85 28 FF FF FF
48 8B 00
48 85 C0
75 0A
lea rax, Curl_cstrdup
mov rax, [rax]
mov rdx, [rbp-0xA0]
mov rdi, rdx
call rax
mov rdx, rax
mov rax, [rbp-0xD8]
mov [rax], rdx
mov rax, [rbp-0xD8]
mov rax, [rax]
test rax, rax
jnz short 0x0A
48 8D 05 F1 6F 21 00
FF 10
48 89 03
48 85 C0
0F 84 C3 05 00 00
lea rax, Curl_cstrdup
call qword ptr [rax]
mov [rbx], rax
test rax, rax
jz 0x05C3
O0 Optimization
curl_url_get()
O1 Optimization
curl_url_get()
Fig. 3. Layout-Based Introduction of GPI and Unintended Gadgets
machine independent compiler optimizations to be designed to detect and avoid these harmful
effects. An assembler injection-based solution for eliminating these types of gadgets using nop
sleds has been proposed by Onarlioglu et al. [2010], however this solution is limited to retn GPIs
and results in significant increases in code size due to the lack of direct control over the binary
layout. An ideal mitigation strategy for this problem would require direct control over program
layout, and would primarily avoid problematic displacements by reordering blocks and functions.
6 MITIGATION
In this section, we describe and assess two recompiler passes that implement our proposed strategy
for addressing GPI duplication. With respect to our other proposed strategies, we leave the cost-
benefit analysis of using Clang’s tail call elimination pass to the reader as it is highly situational.
Also, we consider the implementation of a broad set of binary transformations to address unintended
gadgets found in binaries to be future work that is outside the scope of this paper.
6.1 Egalito Binary Recompiler
Egalito [Williams-King et al. 2020] is a binary transformation framework that lifts position-
independent ELF binaries to Egalito intermediate representation (EIR). EIR is a low-level, machine-
dependent, and layout-agnostic IR that allows for arbitrary transformations prior to re-compilation
back to an ELF binary. Lifting to EIR requires precise disassembly of the binary, which Egalito
accomplishes by using metadata present in the position-independent code (PIC) for analysis. PIC is
dominant in most Linux binaries, and allows for full disassembly in a vast majority of cases.
We select Egalito as the engine for our mitigation passes for three primary reasons. First, Egalito
is designed for transformation of machine-dependent EIR and therefore is readily capable of
addressing code reuse gadgets, as opposed to existing compiler toolchains such as LLVM [Lattner
and Adve 2004] which are primarily designed for machine-independent optimization. Second,
Egalito is compiler agnostic, allowing a single implementation of our mitigation passes to address
problems regardless of the compiler used. Finally, implementing our passes in Egalito allows our
work to address legacy binaries, provided that they are compatible with Egalito (i.e., it is PIC).
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6.2 GPI Merging
Our mitigation passes are designed to address GPI duplication behavior without significant detri-
ment to performance. We observe that the benefits of duplicating GPIs intraprocedurally are small,
saving between one and five bytes of code size per eliminated jump as well as the run time required
to execute the jump. Since these benefits are secondary to the intended optimization, it is possi-
ble to re-merge split GPIs and retain the optimization’s primary benefits. Our mitigation passes
eliminate all but one instance of a particular GPI per function. At program points where GPIs are
eliminated, an unconditional near jump to the retained GPI is inserted, effectively merging multiple
GPI instances into a single one. We implemented two intraprocedural GPI merging passes: one that
merges return-type instructions and one that merges indirect jump instructions.
Our returnmerging algorithm (Algorithm 1) operates by scanning each instruction in the function
to determine if it is a return-type instruction. If multiple return-type instructions are found within
the function, one is arbitrarily selected to be the target instruction. All other return type instructions
are replaced with unconditional jump instructions to the target instruction. This algorithm does not
differentiate between instances where return-type instructions were duplicated due to optimization
versus instances where the compiler generates multiple return instructions within a function.
Since the per-merge performance costs are small, we intentionally design this recompiler pass to
aggressively merge return-type instructions to achieve maximum impact on the gadget set.
Our indirect jump merging algorithm (Algorithm 2) operates in a manner similar to our return
merging algorithm. The primary difference is that indirect jumps can only be merged if they target
the same register. During the instruction scan, if an indirect jump instruction is found, it is placed
into a map data structure in which each register is mapped to a list of indirect jump instructions
targeting the register. When the register scan is complete, the map is searched for any registers
with more than one indirect jump instruction targeting it. If found, the indirect jump instructions
are merged in the same manner as return instructions in the return merging algorithm.
Algorithm 1Merge Return Statements
1: procedureMergeReturn(Function F)
2: ReturnSet(Rs ) ← Null
3: for all BasicBlock(BBi ) ∈ F do
4: for all instruction(I ) ∈ BBi do
5: if I is a return then
6: Rs ← Rs ∪ I
7: Tarдet(T ) ← address of some I ∈ Rs
8: Rs ← Rs − I
9: for all return(ri ) ∈ Rs do
10: Replace ri with jmp T
6.3 Impact on Gadget Sets
To determine how effective our passes are at reducing the availability and utility of code reuse
gadgets, we used Egalito to recompile position-independent variants of our benchmark programs
built at optimization level O31. We then used GSA to measure the change in gadget set quality
metrics after applying our passes. Our results are reported in Table 8.
1Several O3 program variants in our study were originally built as position-dependent binaries. These variants were rebuilt
as PIC to assess our mitigations. As a result, O3 gadget set metric values in this section differ from those in Section 4.
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Algorithm 2Merge Indirect Jump Statements
1: procedureMergeIndirectJump(Function F)
2: I JMap(r , jumpListr ) ← Null
3: for all BasicBlock(BBi ) ∈ F do
4: for all instruction(I ) ∈ BBi do
5: if I is a Indirect Jump then
6: Ri ← Indirect Jump Target Register of I
7: jumpListRi ← Jump list mapped to I JMap(Ri )
8: Add I to jumpListRi
9: for all jumpListr ∈ I JMap do
10: if Size of jumpListr > 1 then
11: Tarдet(T ) ← address of some jr ∈ jumpListr
12: jumpListr ← jumpListr − jr
13: for all indirect Jump(jk ) ∈ jumpListr do
14: Replace jk with jmp T
The effects of our mitigation passes on functional gadget set expressivity were mixed. While
our passes did reduce the overall expressivity of the gadget set in 38.2% (13 of 34) of variants,
overall expressivity increases were observed at roughly the same rate. These increases are due to
transformation induced gadget introduction caused by layout changes or GPIs encoded in jump
displacements introduced by our passes. These effects can be compensated for with additional
mitigation passes that address unintended gadgets, which we identify as future work.
Our passes were highly effective at reducing the number of useful gadgets available after recom-
pilation. Our passes significantly reduced the total number of quality gadgets in all 36 variants at
an average rate of 30.7%. While the lowest reduction rate observed was 8%, this occurred in smaller
benchmarks with very few initial gadgets. We observed a maximum reduction rate of 61%, and in
9 of 34 variants the number of quality gadgets was reduced by at least 40%. In addition to large
reductions in the number of quality gadgets, the average quality score across gadgets within each
set generally increased, indicating that the gadgets remaining after recompilation were generally
more difficult to use in exploit chains.
Our passes were also highly effective at reducing the diversity of special purpose gadgets
available in recompiled gadget sets. We observed a decrease in the number of special purpose
gadget categories available in half of variants, with multiple categories of gadgets eliminated in
29.4% (10 of 34) of total variants. We observed no change in the total number of categories available
in 35.3% (12 of 34) of variants. In three of these instances the unmodified O3 variant had no special
purpose gadgets present to eliminate, and in the remaining instances the unmodified O3 variant
had two or fewer special purpose gadget types present. We did observe an increase of one special
purpose gadget type for five variants, most of which occurred in Clang produced variants.
7 PERFORMANCE IMPACTS
To answer our final motivating question, we conducted an analysis of our recompiled variants to
determine the impact of our mitigating passes on execution speed and code size.
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Table 8. Effects of Mitigation Passes on Gadget Set Metrics for O3 Variants
Functional Gadget
Set Expressivity
Functional Gadget
Set Quality
S.P. Gadget
Availability
Benchmark O3 MP ∆ O3 MP ∆ O3 MP ∆
Bftpd 6/13/6 6/13/7 (0/0/-1) 320 / 0.93 234 / 0.90 (86 / 0.03) 2 3 (-1)
libcUrl 9/28/14 10/27/13 (-1/1/1) 4189 / 0.70 2843 / 0.72 (1346 / -0.01) 4 4 (0)
git 11/34/16 10/33/16 (1/1/0) 6758 / 0.90 4031 / 0.98 (2727 / -0.08) 5 3 (2)
gzip 8/23/10 7/21/11 (1/2/-1) 360 / 0.92 269 / 1.00 (91 / -0.07) 3 2 (1)
httpd 8/22/11 8/24/11 (0/-2/0) 2881 / 0.82 1623 / 0.87 (1258 / -0.05) 5 4 (1)
libsqlite 10/30/13 9/30/14 (1/0/-1) 2966 / 0.86 1758 / 0.91 (1208 / -0.05) 4 2 (2)
401.bzip2 5/16/6 5/17/6 (0/-1/0) 267 / 0.66 205 / 0.67 (62 / -0.01) 1 1 (0)
403.gcc 11/35/17 11/35/17 (0/0/0) 10859 / 0.82 5429 / 0.95 (5430 / -0.13) 6 4 (2)
429.mcf 5/9/4 4/8/3 (1/1/1) 88 / 0.69 74 / 0.78 (14 / -0.08) 1 1 (0)
433.milc 7/23/8 7/25/8 (0/-2/0) 586 / 0.83 390 / 0.79 (196 / 0.03) 1 1 (0)
444.namd 9/25/9 8/23/7 (1/2/2) 241 / 0.77 206 / 0.75 (35 / 0.02) 1 1 (0)
445.gobmk 7/31/14 10/33/15 (-3/-2/-1) 3190 / 0.92 1294 / 1.07 (1896 / -0.16) 6 2 (4)
456.hmmer 7/29/11 8/28/12 (-1/1/-1) 1300 / 0.82 758 / 0.97 (542 / -0.14) 3 2 (1)
458.sjeng 8/17/9 8/21/11 (0/-4/-2) 541 / 0.80 356 / 0.84 (185 / -0.04) 3 1 (2)
462.libquantum 6/17/6 6/16/6 (0/1/0) 236 / 0.72 175 / 0.75 (61 / -0.04) 1 1 (0)
470.lbm 4/15/3 4/15/3 (0/0/0) 79 / 0.69 69 / 0.72 (10 / -0.03) 1 1 (0)
G
C
C
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482.sphinx3 9/24/11 10/27/11 (-1/-3/0) 701 / 0.84 469 / 0.87 (232 / -0.03) 2 1 (1)
Bftpd 6/13/6 6/13/7 (0/0/-1) 309 / 0.91 235 / 0.90 (74 / 0.00) 2 3 (-1)
libcUrl 8/30/13 8/26/10 (0/4/3) 4180 / 0.68 3330 / 0.67 (850 / 0.01) 4 5 (-1)
git 10/34/17 11/34/16 (-1/0/1) 7061 / 0.80 4308 / 0.79 (2753 / 0.01) 5 3 (2)
gzip 7/18/7 6/14/7 (1/4/0) 309 / 0.92 197 / 0.80 (112 / 0.12) 2 2 (0)
httpd 10/27/10 8/24/10 (2/3/0) 2444 / 0.74 1479 / 0.71 (965 / 0.04) 5 3 (2)
libsqlite 8/31/14 11/31/13 (-3/0/1) 2974 / 0.72 1895 / 0.72 (1079 / 0.00) 5 2 (3)
401.bzip2 6/17/4 6/16/4 (0/1/0) 207 / 0.77 171 / 0.79 (36 / -0.01) 2 1 (1)
403.gcc 11/35/17 11/34/16 (0/1/1) 9229 / 0.78 5220 / 0.88 (4009 / -0.10) 6 3 (3)
429.mcf 6/10/6 6/10/6 (0/0/0) 108 / 0.97 90 / 0.97 (18 / 0.00) 0 0 (0)
433.milc 8/24/10 8/25/11 (0/-1/-1) 446 / 0.92 374 / 0.87 (72 / 0.05) 0 1 (-1)
444.namd 6/23/9 6/26/11 (0/-3/-2) 407 / 0.67 373 / 0.71 (34 / -0.04) 0 1 (-1)
445.gobmk 10/34/15 10/32/15 (0/2/0) 3001 / 0.81 1185 / 0.91 (1816 / -0.10) 6 2 (4)
456.hmmer 8/30/11 7/30/12 (1/0/-1) 1161 / 0.89 682 / 0.94 (479 / -0.05) 2 2 (0)
458.sjeng 9/30/12 8/25/11 (1/5/1) 502 / 0.91 320 / 0.89 (182 / 0.01) 1 0 (1)
462.libquantum 5/23/8 5/25/9 (0/-2/-1) 251 / 0.87 187 / 0.78 (64 / 0.09) 0 0 (0)
470.lbm 3/13/3 3/13/3 (0/0/0) 74 / 0.84 68 / 0.88 (6 / -0.04) 0 0 (0)
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482.sphinx3 7/25/11 9/27/12 (-2/-2/-1) 691 / 0.81 519 / 0.84 (172 / -0.03) 2 1 (1)
7.1 Execution Speed
To analyze the impact of our mitigations on execution speed, we ran the position-independent O0,
O3, and recompiled variants of our SPEC 2006 benchmarks using reference workloads2. We record
the total run time for each variant across three trials to determine its average performance, shown
in Figures 4 and 5. We observed that binaries recompiled with our passes enabled saw a performance
slowdown of 0.28% on average, with a maximum observed slowdown of 1.9%. In five instances,
performance was improved via our mitigations. These performance impacts are negligible over
O3 performance, and are imperceptible considering the large performance improvements (2.3x
speedup on average) O3 variants enjoy over O0 variants. Thus, recompiling production optimized
2While we performed functional testing of the recompiled variants of our common Linux benchmarks to ensure they were
not corrupted during recompilation, we exclude them from this analysis due to a lack of standardized performance tests.
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Fig. 4. Performance Comparison of SPEC 2006 GCC Variants Recompiled with Mitigation Passes (s)
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Fig. 5. Performance Comparison of SPEC 2006 Clang Variants Recompiled with Mitigation Passes (s)
code with our mitigation passes provides the best of both worlds: nearly identical performance to
optimized code without the accompanying increase in gadget utility and availability.
7.2 Code Size
Recompiling binaries with Egalito can result in significant changes to code size, even when no
transformation passes are run on the EIR. This is due to differences in Egalito’s code generation
conventions regarding program layout, function padding, and control-flow. In this analysis, we
are interested both in how Egalito impacts code size as well as the incremental impact of our
mitigation passes. Table 9 contains the binary sizes of the compiler-produced position-independent
O3 variant (i.e., the baseline), a control variant produced by recompiling the baseline with no EIR
passes selected, and a variant produced by recompiling the baseline with our passes enabled.
While the Egalito recompilation process can cause significant changes in code size (both positive
and negative), our mitigation passes typically do not incrementally increase code size beyond
that caused by Egalito. We observed only 7 instances across 34 variants in which our passes
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Table 9. Impact of Mitigation Passes on Code Size (kB)
GCC Clang
Benchmark O3 Control MP ∆MP O3 Control MP ∆MP
Bftpd 314.6 116.0 116.0 0 99.5 116.0 116.0 0
libcUrl 485.2 460.2 460.2 0 455.6 439.7 439.7 0
git 19403.2 3626.3 3630.4 4.1 11195.0 3151.2 3155.3 4.1
gzip 433.4 488.8 488.8 0 108.6 464.3 464.3 0
httpd 925.6 910.7 914.8 4.1 842.3 837.0 837.0 0
libsqlite 5024.5 927.1 931.2 4.1 6643.7 1328.5 1328.5 0
401.bzip2 110.6 128.3 128.3 0 98.5 116.1 116.1 0
403.gcc 4750.1 5203.3 5215.6 12.3 4021.3 4507.0 4511.1 4.1
429.mcf 26.9 54.5 54.5 0 23.0 58.7 58.7 0
433.milc 197.5 238.8 238.8 0 176.9 222.5 222.5 0
444.namd 349.5 365.9 365.9 0 333.1 353.7 353.7 0
445.gobmk 4746.6 6956.4 6956.4 0 4590.0 6804.9 6804.9 0
456.hmmer 410.6 480.5 480.5 0 376.5 452.0 452.0 0
458.sjeng 205.1 2794.8 2794.8 0 163.8 2753.9 2753.9 0
462.libquantum 55.2 75.0 75.0 0 59.7 79.2 79.2 0
470.lbm 22.1 46.3 46.3 0 22.2 50.5 50.5 0
482.sphinx3 278.8 308.5 312.6 4.1 246.8 275.8 275.8 0
incrementally increased the binary size. In all but one of these cases, the increase was less than 5
kilobytes. In the remaining case, the increase was less than 13 kilobytes. With respect to the impact
of recompilation on code size, we observed that code size impacts were typically negligible. In 26.5%
(9 of 34) of variants, recompilation reduced code size, and in 52.9% (18 of 34) of cases recompilation
increased code size by less than 80 kilobytes. In the remaining 7 variants, large increases in code
size were observed, in some cases many times over the baseline size. This potentially indicates
edge cases where Egalito’s code generation conventions can be improved.
8 LIMITATIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS
8.0.1 Study Limitations. Our study is limited to C/C++ source programs compiled by GCC and
Clang that target x86-64 machines. Further research is necessary to determine the effects of
optimizations implemented in other compilers and architectures. Also, our fine-grained analysis is
limited to a single optimization per variant as it was neither feasible nor necessary to consider each
permutation of optimizations. In practice, optimizations are known to interact with each other;
these synergistic effects may need to be considered when applying mitigation strategies.
Linked libraries our benchmarks depend on were not analyzed in our study. Because these
libraries are mapped into the program’s memory space at run-time, gadgets found in library code
area also available to the attacker. However, utilizing them is difficult in practice due to defensive
techniques such as ASLR [PaX 2020]. Fortunately, Egalito provides a Union ELF mode in which
the input binary and its linked libraries are combined into a single output ELF prior during re-
compilation. In this mode, EIR passes like mitigation passes we present in this paper can be readily
applied to library code.
8.0.2 Tool Limitations. GSA’s functional gadget set expressivity analysis is limited to small size
ROP gadgets only. In practice, this covers the majority of practical security use cases as ROP exploits
typically avoid long gadgets and JOP / COP exploits are rare in the wild. Future research in this
area should consider expressivity impacts with respect to JOP and COP, as well as the expressive
contributions of arbitrary length ROP gadgets.
22
Understanding and Mitigating Impacts of Optimizations on Gadget Sets
Our gadget eliminating passes implemented for the Egalito binary recompiler are subject to
the same limitations as the tool itself. Of particular importance, Egalito requires input programs
to be position-independent code (PIC). Additionally, Egalito does not support obfuscated code or
programs with inline assembly, among other limitations.
9 RELATEDWORK
In response to the introduction of gadget-based CRA methods, a number of defenses against these
attacks have been proposed. These techniques can be categorized into compiler-based defenses
and retrofitting transformations on binaries. Both categories of approaches incur cost in the form
of increased code size and run-time execution/memory overhead. These techniques have been
shown to be effective at mitigating CRAs, however weaknesses in these approaches have also been
identified [Conti et al. 2015; Davi et al. 2014; Evans et al. 2015; Schwartz et al. 2011].
Compiler-based defenses perform two tasks in the compiler. First, they rewrite instructions that
contain unintended gadgets into semantically equivalent code that does not. Second, intended
gadgets are secured by rewriting the instructions to use alternate control flow mechanisms [Li et al.
2010] or by inserting simple run-time protections such as encrypted branch targets or control-flow
locks [Bletsch et al. 2011a; Onarlioglu et al. 2010]. Retrofitting transformations operate on binaries
after they have been produced by the compiler. In general, these techniques identify and protect
control flow branches and targets using inserted instructions that enforce run-time control-flow
integrity [Abadi et al. 2005; Hawkins et al. 2016; Kayaalp et al. 2012b; Zhang and Sekar 2013] or
detect anomalous run-time behavior [Chen et al. 2009; Davi et al. 2009, 2011; Yao et al. 2013].
Our approach differs from prior work primarily in that it proactively eliminates intended gadgets
via post-compiler transformation techniques rather than relying on costly run-time protections or
static transformations that cause large increases in code size. We consider our proposed mitigations
to be complementary to these approaches; our proposed mitigations can potentially reduce the
overhead costs of other defenses by reducing the number of unintended gadgets that require
transformation and distinct branches that require instrumentation and run-time protection.
A recent study conducted by Louboutin et al. [2019] explored the effects of production environ-
ment on gadget density. One experiment conducted in this work compares the resulting gadget
densities of two programs created with GCC and Clang. They found that compilation options
produce similar effects on both binaries and that the choice of compiler influences the resulting
gadget density. However, the sample size of the study is very small and the metric used in this work
is derived from gadget counts, which have been shown to be a poor security-oriented metric [Brown
and Pande 2019a], limiting the utility of these findings.
10 CONCLUSION
We presented the results of our broad study of the impacts of compiler optimizations on the code
reuse gadget sets in optimized binaries. Through coarse and fine-grained analysis of optimization
behavior across 1,000 variants of 17 different benchmark programs, we discovered that the gadget
sets present in optimized code are significantly more useful for constructing CRA exploit chains
than unoptimized code. We identified and detailed the root causes of our observations through
differential binary analysis, and proposed potential mitigation strategies. We implemented one
of these strategies, GPI merging, and showed that it can significantly reduce the availability and
utility of code reuse gadget sets in optimized code. Finally, we demonstrated that these benefits
can be obtained with negligible performance impact through a performance analysis of binaries
transformed with our GPI merging passes.
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Table 10. GCC Single Optimization Variants Studied
O0 O1 O2
(1) tree-sink (35) partial-inlining (73) peel-loops
(2) ipa-profile (36) ipa-icf (74) tree-loop-vectorize
(3) tree-bit-ccp (37) indirect-inlining (75) inline-functions
(4) branch-count-reg (38) tree-tail-merge (76) predictive-commoning
(5) forward-propagate (39) reorder-functions (77) tree-slp-vectorize
(6) compare-elim (40) ipa-ra (78) split-paths
(7) ssa-phiopt (41) isolate-erroneous-paths-dereference (79) tree-partial-pre
(8) tree-ch (42) ipa-cp (80) tree-loop-distribute-patterns
(9) cprop-registers (43) reorder-blocks-and-partition (81) unswitch-loops
(10) tree-dse (44) caller-saves (82) ipa-cp-clone
(11) ipa-reference (45) expensive-optimizations (83) split-loops
(12) tree-sra (46) ipa-icf-variables (84) gcse-after-reload
(13) tree-builtin-call-dce (47) optimize-strlen
(14) tree-fre (48) crossjumping
(15) tree-coalesce-vars (49) ipa-vrp
(16) split-wide-types (50) thread-jumps
(17) tree-ccp (51) ipa-icf-functions
(18) tree-dce (52) gcse
(19) reorder-blocks (53) code-hoisting
(20) tree-dominator-opts (54) strict-overflow
(21) tree-pta (55) devirtualize-speculatively
(22) inline-functions-called-once (56) devirtualize
(23) tree-ter (57) cse-follow-jumps
(24) guess-branch-probability (58) ira-remat
(25) move-loop-invariants (59) rerun-cse-after-loop
(26) ipa-pure-const (60) tree-switch-conversion
(27) defer-pop (61) hoist-adjacent-loads
(28) tree-slsr (62) store-merging
(29) omit-frame-pointer (63) align-labels
(30) shrink-wrap (64) schedule-insns2
(31) tree-copy-prop (65) ipa-sra
(32) if-conversion (66) peephole2
(33) combine-stack-adjustments (67) tree-vrp
(34) if-conversion (68) ipa-bit-cp
(69) optimize-sibling-calls
(70) inline-small-functions
(71) tree-pre
(72) strict-aliasing
A APPENDICES
A.1 Single Optimization Variants Analyzed
Table 10 contains the single optimization variants that were generated using the GCC compiler for
this study. Table 11 contains the single optimization variants that were generated using the Clang
compiler for this study. In both tables, the column identifier indicates the baseline optimization
that the single optimization variant was compared against using GSA.
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Table 11. Clang Single Optimization Variants Studied
O0 O1 O2
(1) loop-deletion (21) bdce (41) mldst-motion (47) callsite-splitting
(2) loop-distribute (22) loop-simplify (42) gvn (48) aggressive-instcombine
(3) sroa (23) instcombine (43) slp-vectorizer (49) argpromotion
(4) adce (24) jump-threading (44) constmerge
(5) memcpyopt (25) simplifycfg (45) inline
(6) deadargelim (26) div-rem-pairs (46) elim-avail-extern
(7) correlated-propagation (27) libcalls-shrinkwrap
(8) loop-rotate (28) globaldce
(9) functionattrs (29) dse
(10) loop-idiom (30) loop-sink
(11) omit-frame-pointer (31) loop-unroll
(12) lcssa (32) loop-vectorize
(13) reassociate (33) tailcallelim
(14) loop-load-elim (34) alignment-from-assumptions
(15) speculative-execution (35) licm
(16) loop-unswitch (36) strip-dead-prototypes
(17) early-cse (37) float2int
(18) indvars (38) prune-eh
(19) sccp (39) ipsccp
(20) globalopt (40) called-value-propagation
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